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SPECIAL SECTION INTRODUCTION
Introduction
For an anthropology of history
Stephan Palmié, University of Chicago
Charles Stewart, University College London
Although Sahlins proposed it over thirty years ago, and notwithstanding various noteworthy 
contributions in the interim, a concerted anthropology of history has not yet come into 
being. This introduction, and the case studies which follow it, lay out the interrogatives of 
such an endeavor by reference to ethnographic and historical studies of Cuba, Madagascar, 
Papua New Guinea, the United States, and early modern Euro-America. The anthropology 
of history inquires foremost into the very idea of history—the assumptions, principles, 
and practices that inform the acquisition of knowledge about the past, and its social 
presentation. Finding the terms to understand alternative forms of history making requires 
an ethnographic and historical sense of how the Western concept of history (historicism) 
came to be and how this historicism is, in fact, lodged within a plurality of alternative 
practices in Western communities. We see the anthropology of history as a large collective 
interdisciplinary enterprise that will involve archaeologists, historians, and many others in 
understanding the possibilities of history as a practice and as an analytic. 
Keywords: chronotope, eventuation, historicism, past relationships, revelation and history, 
temporal pollution. 
We have had history and anthropology, historical anthropology, and even anthro-
history (Murphy et al. 2011), but as yet there has been no concerted anthropology 
of history. The insertion of the preposition “of ” has epistemic repercussions dispro-
portionate to its grammatical minimalism. We have long been accustomed to view-
ing all forms of knowledge production as open to historical study—the natural sci-
ences have their historians, and the history of anthropology has long existed (Lowie 
1937; Hodgen 1964; Stocking 1968). The anthropology of history invites critical 
reorientation by turning history itself, as a form of knowledge and social praxis, 
into an object of anthropological inquiry. Through ethnography, anthropology can 
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provide perspectives that historiography or the philosophy of history cannot of-
fer—not only because they mainly consider written texts, but also because their 
analytic lenses have been trained exclusively on Western historical thought.1 
An anthropology of history, as envisioned in this collection, extends the explo-
ration of how history is conceived and represented to take in non-Western societ-
ies, where ethnographic study can reveal local forms of historical production that 
do not conform to the canons of standard historiography (Hastrup 1991; Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1992: 157; and see Feierman 1999 for striking examples). People 
produce representations of the past obliquely, in practices such as dancing (McCall 
2000), spirit séances (Lambek 2002; Palmié 2013a), or encounters with artifacts 
(Hodges 2013; Stewart 2012). Just as kinship studies have come to focus on the 
practices by which consociates establish relationships with one another (Howell 
2001), the anthropological study of history takes on the broader task of establishing 
and analyzing what the historian J. G. A. Pocock (1962) felicitously called human 
“past relationships,” in all their stunning diversity. To be sure, an anthropology of 
the ways in which people variously conceptualize and morally evaluate the past in 
its relation to the present (and future) seems thinkable along such lines, and while 
it has, indeed, been repeatedly proposed by Sahlins (1981, 1985, 2004), it has decid-
edly not taken organized shape.2
Considering the enormous influence of Sahlins’ work, many anthropologists 
might feel that they have long been doing the anthropology of history. Nonetheless, 
the inquiry into what passes for history here or elsewhere—in the sense of guiding 
principles and assumptions (more than substantive historical representations)—
has not been the main framework for very many works.3 While aware of local ways 
1. For an eclectic and woefully incomplete sample see, for example, Bernheim (1908); 
Becker (1932); Oakeshott (1933); Beard (1934); Collingwood (1946); Gardener (1961); 
Dray (1964); Danto (1965); White (1973, 1978); Mink (1978); Ricoeur (1984); Novick 
(1998); Ankersmit (2005). None of them are concerned with what we might, for the 
moment, call “non-Western” modes of knowing and representing the past. 
2. To clear some analytical ground right away, we do not think that the debate—largely 
among historians—about “history and memory” that began to unfold internationally 
in the aftermath of Pierre Nora’s (1989) influential essay on the “lieux de mémoire” 
has done much to clarify these matters (see Klein 2000 for a useful critique; cf. Palmié 
2010). If anything, we would argue that this debate represented a diversion from the 
issues on which an “anthropology of history” should focus: namely the consideration 
of any and all practices of establishing “past relationships.” Another development that 
we will not touch upon in this introduction is colonial and postcolonial history. Such 
scholarship has made important contributions towards a critique of non-Western his-
toriographies whose tacit “theoretical subject” remained Europe (Chakrabarty 2000: 
34; cf. Prakash 1990, but see Dirlik 1994 for a scathing critique). Still, but perhaps not 
surprisingly, history per se was not a concerted focus in these studies and debates: it 
was the medium in which they were conducted. 
3. Sutton (1998) and Lambek (2002) would be two exceptions, both of which offer em-
pirical studies of the poetics of history. There is no synoptic theoretical book on the 
anthropology of history, and there are no edited collections on the subject. South 
American specialists have perhaps come closest to the interrogatives posed here with 
their illuminating considerations of history vs. myth, and of Amazonian historicities 
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of conceptualizing “the historical,” and occasionally homing in on it, anthropolo-
gists have, for the most part, and quite justifiably, allowed their ethnography to 
take them where it leads, thereby producing studies classified under other head-
ings. The contributors to this collection might, under other circumstances, have 
developed their studies into, respectively, a social history of American fairs and 
commemorative stamps, the procedures and politics of spirit possession, Christian 
conversion, and Euro-American calendrics. Instead, these subjects are all explored 
for what they might reveal about local conceptions of space-time and the relation-
ships between past, present, and future. This introduction seeks to delineate the 
analytical, theoretical, and empirical considerations involved in treating (the very 
idea of) history as an object of study in the conviction that much more research 
remains to be done in this area, the results of which need to be brought into com-
parison and theorized. 
 To begin to locate practices analagous to Western “history,” one must consider 
very closely what one assumes history to consist in. The value of an anthropology 
of history lies as much in conceptual unpacking as it does in the variety of practices 
it might bring to notice. Such a project will not only require identifying contem-
porary Western historiography and its “historicist” philosophical underpinnings as 
objects of study in their own right; it will also have to encompass vernacular West-
ern practices such as the writing and consumption of historical fiction, the staging 
of historical walking tours, or the issuing of commemorative postage stamps (Han-
dler, this collection), and set these practices side by side with, for example, spirit 
possession in Madagascar (Lambek, this collection), Melanesian engagements 
with biblical genealogy (Handman, this collection), teleportations across dispa-
rate “chronotopes” prompted by verbal and musical performance in Cuba (Wirtz, 
this collection), or, indeed, the eschatological concerns (Hamann, this collection) 
that led to the institutionalization of the modern supposedly secular calendar. The 
ethnographic studies in this collection deepen awareness of received ideas about 
proper Western history, both by exposing these to close inspection, and by examin-
ing alternatives, which throw standard Western, historicist assumptions into high 
relief. 
The study of history that we propose may easily fall prey to ordinary-language 
misunderstandings and, at the risk of belaboring the point, it is necessary to register 
two caveats. In our view, “the anthropology of history” should not be understood to 
mean the anthropological study of past times, and conflated with a well-recognized 
field called “anthropological history” or “historical anthropology” (Burke 1987). 
That enterprise involves bringing anthropological knowledge to bear on past so-
cieties, such as Ladurie (1980) did by presenting his study of the medieval French 
village of Montaillou on the model of a village ethnography, or as Price (1983) did 
in reading the present-day Saramaka maroons’ recollections of their eighteenth-
century freedom struggle against the records of the Dutch colonial state. In con-
trast to such efforts at harnessing anthropological methods and perspectives to the 
goal of representing the past, the anthropology of history that we propose focuses 
foremost on the principles, whether ideological, cosmological, or scientific—call 
(Hill 1988; Gow 2001; Whitehead 2003; Fausto and Heckenberger 2007; Oakdale and 
Course 2014). 
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them broadly cultural—that underpin practices of inquiry into the past, as well 
as the forms and modes in which the past is represented to others.4 The second 
caveat is this: when we refer to the “West,” as in “standard Western history,” we are 
referring to principles of historical research espoused by the history profession and 
taught in schools and universities in many parts of the world (in and outside the 
West). Following a tradition of usage, we term this approach “historicism.”5 As not-
ed above, historical practices within any Western community—and likely within 
any community in the world—are not homogeneous. The West is not exceptional 
in this respect, but its epistemological economy is particular insofar as historicism 
occupies a hegemonic place within it. Historicist procedures are necessary in order 
to have a chance to win cases in court or debates in government or at the university 
seminar table. The ghost hunter as well as the creationist know, at some level, that 
theirs is not the dominant view in the secular nation-states they inhabit. And many 
native communities engulfed by such states know, again at some level, that even 
though their own vision of the past may clash with dominant historicist versions 
of it, the latter are ignored only at one’s peril. The power of historicism has affected 
the rest of the world and become part of local epistemological economies, although 
in often highly divergent ways. When we speak of “Western history,” then, we will 
aim to be clear when we are referring to the coherent paradigm of historicism, and 
when we are referring to the plurality of historicizing practices that mingle and 
contest one another in a given Western society: Western history as paradigm, on 
the one hand, and Western history as nonhomogeneous social field, on the other.
Recognizing these tensions is a necessary step in the anthropology of history 
since anthropology, as a post-Enlightenment discipline, has long shared the as-
sumptions of standard Western history (i.e., historicism). This has impeded the 
ability to recognize alternative historicizing practices as such. The anthropology 
of history must find a way out of this predicament. The anthropologist of history 
works within a Western science paradigm that enjoins logical argument, evidence, 
and proof, while identifying other historicizing practices grounded in different 
principles. The goal is to capture how these other practices succeed in representing 
the past in ways that local societies—and possibly the anthropologist, too—find 
4. This change of focus may be compared to the foundation of science and technology 
studies, which turned from the sociology and history of science in the vein of Merton 
or Kuhn to the work of, for example, Barnes, Bloor, Latour, Woolgar, Knorr-Cetina, 
Law, or Pickering. The crucial move involved in this transition was away from an agen-
da that sought social or intellectual explanations (often framed as either “externalist” 
or “internalist”) for the growth of scientific knowledge, and toward concerted empirical 
interrogations (initially often in the form of lab ethnographies) of what science is as a 
social praxis, and what it does in the world.
5. For convenience we list the main tenets of historicism: (1) the assumption of temporal 
linearity; (2) chronological code; (3) basis in objective evidence/objectivity; (4) inten-
tionally produced on the basis of research, usually in writing (historiography); (5) the 
separation of temporal zones—past, present, future; (6) the assumption that events are 
contingent and unpredictable; (7) the avoidance of anachronism—the past must be un-
derstood on its own terms; (8) causality as a standard mode of explanation (see Iggers 
1995; Chakrabarty 2000; Burke 2002). 
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important and convincing. Rather than declaring these alternative procedures for 
history making, and the histories they offer, deficient, we aim to understand them 
in their context. Our approach to Western history is, correspondingly, “critical,” 
not in the sense of judgmental and dismissive, but rather as a ruminative “critique” 
(Foucault 1997; Butler 2002) of the fundamental ways in which Western history has 
been instituted and articulated with common sense. Historians have also subjected 
historicism to critique from the perspectives of postcolonial history (Chakrabarty 
2000), comparative world history (Duara, Murthy, and Sartori. 2014), and, per-
haps less explicitly, ethnohistory (Nabokov 2002). Our complementary angle from 
comparative ethnography contributes to a shared endeavor to find ways to think 
more expansively about “history” by sounding it out—making it ring, to borrow 
the Nietzschean procedure applied in Hamann’s contribution to this collection. For 
the time being, however, we recognize that this introductory essay and the others 
contained in this collection must work largely within historicism in order to be 
intelligible to Western audiences even as they bring to light other versions of his-
tory that depart from Western scholarly standards for history, and so open these 
standards up to the possibility of principled debate. 
The (pre)suppositions of history
One of the things everyone seems to know about history and anthropology is that 
Lévi-Strauss once pronounced that there were two types of society, hot and cold. 
This little phrase, thrown out in an interview, has been one of the most miscon-
strued statements ever produced by anthropology. It was so badly misunderstood 
that Lévi-Strauss (1983, 1998) twice returned to clarify that societies may not be 
divided into historical and ahistorical as a matter of objective classification. In his 
words, his intention in making this distinction was not to “postulate a natural dif-
ference between societies; it does not place them in separate categories. It refers, 
rather, to the subjective attitudes that societies adopt vis-à-vis history; to the vari-
able ways in which they conceive it” (1998: 67).6
All societies differ in their openness to the idea of historical change: some en-
courage it, others suppress it—not the facts of change, but the idea of it. Cultural 
notions as to what constitutes “time,” what is an “event,” what kind of agent can 
bring about “change,” how perceived “change” is set apart from the regular flow 
of happenings—all of these vary from society to society and modulate the under-
standing of what we might call history. Yet, what once seemed like a regrettable, 
ethnocentric stereotypification—we are “hot,” they are “cold”—actually points in 
the right direction. Sahlins’ (2004) refrain “no history without culture” reformu-
lates this basic insight about the cultural modulation of history. 
Causation stands as one pillar of historicism. Causes have effects, and the histo-
rian is trained to locate the antecedents that give rise to a particular configuration 
or event and these are debated. Was it Prussian ambition, Balkan nationalism, a 
6. “Ne postule pas entre les sociétés une difference de nature, elle ne les place pas dans 
des categories séparées mais se réfère aux attitudes subjectives que les sociétés adoptent 
vis-à-vis de l’histoire, aux manières variables dont elles la conçoivent.”
2016 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (1): 207–236
Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart 212
disrupted balance of power in Europe, or one of many other causes that gave rise 
to World War I? Causation depends on other basic building blocks of historicism7 
such as linearity and sequentiality. Present situations give rise to future situations in 
sequence, and time moves forward and accumulates progressively and irreversibly. 
These formulations are absolutely consistent with ideas of bodies, motion, and time 
in classical physics and basic science, and the kind of naturalistic causal unifor-
mitarianism established by Lyell in geology, and then transferred by Darwin into 
the biological realm. That is why linear uniform causality is so difficult to think 
beyond: one would be proposing an alternative to Western common-sense reason 
itself. This is true at some everyday level, even though we might know that in ad-
vanced physics time is relative, and can even go backward. We know this, and yet 
not a few of us would express surprise at the fact that some of our own consociates 
are convinced that they have had personal experiences of past lives or premonitions 
of the future. 
By contrast—or analogy, as it were—the Saulteuax Ojibwa (Hallowell 1955) and 
the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea (Schieffelin 1985) espouse the idea that reciprocity 
governs causation. Commit a moral transgression and something bad will happen 
to you and your group, such as a frightening thunderstorm, an attack by wild ani-
mals, or a bout of serious illness. As Schieffelin reports, “The reciprocity scenario 
embodies deeply felt cultural assumptions concerning the way events in the world 
are constructed and how actions are meaningfully related to one another” (1985: 
48). The Ojibwa, in turn, regard themselves as (human) persons engaged in con-
tinuous moral reciprocity with what Hallowell called “other than human selves” 
(1955: 104), willful and wily, but ethically aware agents, capable of judging human 
action and reacting to the former’s moral infractions in a finely calibrated calculus 
of dream visitations and infliction of “eventful” calamity. Clearly, these are different 
forms of common sense, belonging to people who, in the first case, consider that 
all of nature was originally human, and only later developed into flora and fauna, 
and, in the second, see themselves as part and parcel of a human/nonhuman com-
monwealth in which social infractions can occasion the wrath and retribution of 
nonhuman agents. Considerate exchange with nature—the “nonhuman”—assumes 
moral overtones, and results in real events. Expressions in our own society such as 
“what goes around comes around,” “just deserts,” “karma,” or “divine punishment” 
do not pass muster as serious rational statements, still less break through into the 
armory of historical method. At best they are wishful thinking, at worst an intima-
tion of a theodicy that needs to be kept at abeyance at all costs, lest it violate one 
of the core tenets of historicism (Chakrabarty 2000): the ontological injunction 
against supernatural causation.
The intrusion of the numinous into the phenomenal world (or so we have come 
to think of it since Kant)—put differently: the agency of the nonhuman in human 
7. To eliminate any potential confusion with Popper’s (1957) use of the term “historicism,” 
we need to clarify that we consider the contingency and unpredictability of events to be 
a signature feature of modern historicism. In labeling Marx’s belief in historical destiny 
“historicism,” Popper was criticizing it for its teleology; hence his title, The poverty of 
historicism. From our perspective, Popper’s insistence that there is no pattern to history 
exemplifies and champions historicism.
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affairs—is only part of the problem. But it is one that medievalist historians know 
all too well. No historian of the European Middle Ages can risk importing the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century visions of “rational man” acting in a secular, 
amoral universe—so commonly smuggled into accounts of non-Western societ-
ies—into scenarios where people were thought to subsist on nothing but the host 
and droplets of holy water for years on end, where fragments of martyred saint-
ly bodies were expected to exert causal influence on the course of human affairs 
(Bynum 1992), or where the teenage girl we know as Joan of Arc retrospectively 
became an “agent of history” only because she was the “patient” of angelic com-
munications. And, one might add in historical retrospect, because the angels spoke 
to her about courses of action that happened to relate to the wars between France 
and England of her time, and happened to have an impact on their course (or so 
we think today). 
This raises another issue that philosophical historicism banned as beyond 
the pale of acceptable and legitimate accounts of the past: that of historical 
knowledge derived not from diligent and painstaking research and reconstruc-
tion, but through revelation, mantic technique, oneiric, prophetic, or otherwise 
“inspired” (instead of rationally contrived) forms of knowledge production. To 
be sure, Ginzburg (1980) has made a case for the origins in ancient mantic divi-
nation of what he calls the “evidentiary paradigm” still governing the praxis of 
Western historiography. Yet as Koselleck (2004) has argued, one of the crucial 
developments in the rise of modern secular notions of history in the West was 
the suppression of political prophecy, first by the Catholic Church itself in the 
aftermath of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–17), and then, after the peace of 
Westphalia, by states turning away from eschatological visions of the unfolding 
of events and asserting their control over the future by the protracted replace-
ment of inspired prophecy (often based in scriptural visions of the past) with 
rational prognosis in which knowledge of “laws of tendencies” extrapolated from 
historical patterns (a dream that lives on among economic forecasters) was once 
and for all to secularize and rationalize the making of history (Abrams 1972; 
Koselleck 1988, 2004). 
Yet in England, for example, inspired prophecy drawing on visions of the past 
experienced a final flourishing as late as the turbulent last decades of the eigh-
teenth century (with, for example, Joanna Southcott or Richard Brothers), becom-
ing effectively neutralized as a political threat only through the passing of laws 
of insanity in the early nineteenth century (Barr 2006). The principles that ani-
mated “inspired” history by no means became “a matter of the past” in much of 
Europe. Thus in the 1830s, on the island of Naxos in Greece, where Stewart (2012) 
has conducted long-term field research, people experienced dreams of the Virgin 
Mary telling them where to dig to find an icon buried on a hillside. These dreams 
were consistent with the general expectation at the time that dreams revealed the 
future. After five years of intermittent digging, people unearthed four devotional 
Christian icons, and some human bones. In further dreams, the Virgin Mary gave 
them information about how the icons came to be in the mountainside, and in yet 
further dreams and waking stories the villagers expanded this information into a 
historical account. They told of Egyptian Christians arriving on their shores over 
a millennium earlier to escape persecution. The stories included details of these 
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people’s names and described their clothing. Local history, then, was instigated by 
predictive dreams which revealed theretofore unknown pasts.8
While the Naxiots were recurring to a mode of oneiric revelation that can be 
traced back in the Aegean area to the Revelation of St. John9, Handman (this collec-
tion) shows how missionary tutelage of the Guhu-Samane of southwestern Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) eventually prepared them for a similar revelatory discovery 
of their Mediterranean Christian past. The Summer Institute of Linguistics and 
other missionaries have offered different practices of “past relating,” in succession, 
over the last fifty years. First they translated the Bible and gave people contextual 
historical information so that they could understand the biblical meaning of ob-
jects such as mustard seeds or sheepskins in their original place and time; later, 
they identified illustrative equivalents in the Papuan cultural environment so that 
people could localize Christianity and experience it in their own cultural terms; 
and then the Guhu-Samane took the final step. They identified themselves not just 
as Christians, but as the literal descendants of the ancient Hebrews who first con-
verted to Christianity. Their journey through historicism and presentism (Stocking 
1965: 211) culminated in a revelation that radically ruptured their previous under-
standing of their past. Much like the Black Hebrew Israelites of the United States 
and Israel (Dorman 2013; Jackson 2013), the Guhu-Samane discovered not just a 
congruence of, but an identity between, their past and that of the biblical Jews.10 
Rock carvings on their territory, previously considered the sacred engravings made 
by ancestral figures in the distant past, came to be thought of as Hebrew signs, in-
dexes of Jewish presence in PNG. 
One wonders if the missionaries are pleased or dismayed by these developments. 
The Guhu-Samane have jumped into Christianity with both feet, which must count 
as a success, but in the process they have trampled on basic assumptions about 
authenticity which Protestantism has done so much to formulate and disseminate 
8. This is by no means an idiosyncratic example culled from the “Mediterranean margins” 
of “modern Europe”: even if one wanted to apply similar scepticism to Christian’s 
(1996) encyclopedic inventory of visionary events during the second Spanish Republic, 
such critique would hardly stand up to Linse’s (1983) study of millenarian visionaries in 
historicism’s historical homeland, Weimar Germany, or Boyer’s (1992) extensive docu-
mentation of political prophecy in the post-World War II United States. That the state 
of Israel saw itself forced to take active precautions to rein in the flood of American 
Christians flocking to the Holy Land on the eve of Y2K (the secular cyber-apocalypse!) 
to await the Parousia speaks for itself (Goldberg 1999).
9. When the twentieth-century Naxos dreamers wrote in their notebooks, “I saw a sign in 
the sky,” they not only repeated a key theme from the Book of Revelation, they also did 
so in very nearly the same Greek words, thereby revealing a particular relationship to 
the past that required no translation (Stewart 2012: 91). 
10. Further extending the analogy to biblical hermeneutics, we might say that just as John 
the Baptist is read as Christ’s “anti-type” (revealed as such through Christ’s life), for the 
Guhu-Samane, the ancient Hebrews have become the “anti-type” to which their own 
lives provide the “type” (Frye 1981). See Handman’s discussion (this collection) of this 
moment in light of Erich Auerbach’s concept of “figural representation.”
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(Keane 2007). These assumptions are consistent with nationalist historiography11 
where each nation erects a specific and discrete history as the authentic source of 
the collective (Anderson 1983). To be sure, such a view has come under produc-
tive scrutiny by historians,12 but it still inheres in the pedagogies served by national 
secondary school curricula. In such a view, every identifiable human grouping has 
its own individual history and it is impossible—at best mistaken, at worst deceit-
ful—to claim someone else’s history as one’s own. When Guhu-Samane, African 
Americans, or, for that matter, nineteenth-century British adherents of Anglo-
Israelism (Parfitt 2002) declare themselves Hebrews, they diverge from a key as-
sumption of Western historical thought, and court the charge of inauthenticity. 
These examples return us to the topic of common sense about nature considered 
at the beginning of this section. Revelation, as Handman notes (this collection), 
implies rupture with the past, and this flies in the face of the basic Enlightenment 
assumption articulated by Linnaeus in the eighteenth century: “Nature does not 
make jumps” (Natura non facit saltum). Nor does “history” in its secular, histori-
cist sense.13 Miraculous appearances of Hebrew epigraphy in PNG, or even ancient 
Egyptian icons on Naxos, are only acceptable if spatial and temporal contiguity can 
be demonstrated. Continuity is the baseline assumption not just for history or an-
thropology (Robbins 2007), but for all of natural science. In semiotic terms, icons 
cannot be made into indexes by mere charismatic pronouncement. An unbroken 
chain of evidence is needed.
Temporality and event
A closely related presupposition to be considered in this context concerns the 
question of anachronism—the violation of sequential irreversibility—which argu-
ably is both a boon and a bane of modern Western history in that it undergirds 
what Lévi-Strauss (1966: 260) called its chronological code. Handler’s exploration 
of commemorative postage stamps celebrating annual fairs and exhibitions (this 
collection) reveals the arbitrary underside of the code in a deft anthropological 
analysis of history in the heartland of American bureaucracy—the US Post Office 
Department. Successive fairs in American cities around 1900 chose arbitrary mo-
ments in the past to commemorate (e.g., St. Louis’ 1904 fair commemorated the 
1803 Louisiana Purchase; Jamestown 1907, the 1607 Jamestown settlement). On 
the one hand, time was moving forward, while, on the other, the pasts selected 
for commemoration on stamps jumped back and forth in an alternative code. To 
11. Itself arguably a secularized successor of a biblical historical matrix of dispersal and 
descent, as in the paradigmatic cases of the Noahides, the genealogies of the tribes of 
Israel, or the confusion of tongues at the tower of Babel. 
12. Cf. Werner and Zimmermann (2006) for an exposition of the analytical concept of 
“histoire croisée” and Subrahmanyam (1997) and Gruzinski (2002) for useful exempli-
fications of the empirical promise of such approaches.
13. A curious exception to this is the legal fiction of “acts of God” in US insurance and tort 
law concerning unpredictable catastrophic events.
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be sure, all humans live in pluritemporal lifeworlds. Yet in the modern West, the 
simultaneity of the noncontemporaneous (Bloch 1977) has been carefully quar-
antined by concepts such as “tradition,” “heritage,” or, conversely, “survivals” and 
“regression.” Thus while the dead can be seen as our contemporaries, the “truth” of 
statements to that extent can only be metaphorical: as, for example, in cases where 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or investigations into genocidal wars use 
a language of accountability of the living to the dead when it comes to reckoning 
with past atrocities. Yet what if the present absence (Domanska 2006) of the dead, 
in other words, the weight of the past (Lambek 2002), were not only borne by their 
descendants in a symbolic fashion, but constituted part and parcel of the interac-
tional reality of their present social worlds? 
Malagasy spirit possession as considered by Lambek (this collection) represents 
a case in point. While the copresence of the living royal dead in the lives of contem-
porary inhabitants of Majunga is simply a social fact (they reappear in the bodies 
of their mediums at regularly staged royal services), the emergence and prolifera-
tion of hitherto unknown types of jiriky spirits in times of political crisis not only 
prompt reflection on a seeming misalignment of past and present; they amount to a 
poignant comment on the moral and ethical force exerted by the past. In Majunga, 
we might say with Faulkner, “The past is never dead. It’s not even past” ([1951] 
1996: 85). While we will return to the implications of Lambek’s ethnography of 
what Bohannon (1958) might have called an “extra-processual event” in the social 
reproduction of Sakalava “past relationships” (i.e., an unexpected disturbance of 
the flow of ritual eventuation), it is clear that what from a historicist point of view 
looks like “chronological pollution” (Hamann 2008) is constitutive of Sakalava po-
litical ethics not just on a local level, but within the context of Malagasy politics 
more generally.
Or consider here, if in a different register, the case of palo monte, an Afro-Cuban 
ritual complex in which human remains are dug up and incorporated into compos-
ite power objects known as ngangas or prendas (Palmié 2006, 2013b). Within such 
objects, the dead human being (“muerto”) to whom the bones belonged takes on a 
new worldly existence as a nfumbi (a term only poorly glossed as “spirit”). Ritually 
installed in a nganga object, the nfumbi animates a complex new life form capable 
of agentively and eventfully interfering in present human affairs by performing 
mystical “works” at the bidding of a palero, as the human masters of ngangas are 
known. Housed in metal cauldrons, ngangas possess internal logic and coherence. 
Their components act in synergetic concordance, so that while, for example, the 
human remains will guarantee the “inspired” nature—willfulness, personality, 
agentive force, and so on—of a nganga, the addition of, for instance, a dog’s head, 
the skeleton of a bat, or a desiccated scorpion or spider will channel such force by 
amplifying and directing the ways in which the nfumbi will conduct its mystical 
errands (such as smelling out its target, flying in the night, or stinging and sucking 
the life out of the victims of sorcerous attacks and counterattacks). Packets attached 
to the outer surface of a nganga may contain further instructions concerning spe-
cific “works” (trabajos) that the nfumbi is to perform, and the residue of the animal 
or other sacrifices with which a nganga is remunerated for its services will gradu-
ally build up, and often overflow the cauldron itself, spilling out into veritable ritual 
landscapes that can come to fill whole rooms. These have their own depositional 
2016 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (1): 207–236
217 Introduction
logics and histories, and they present a materially accreting record of mystical in-
teractions between the nfumbi and its human master. 
The resulting tableaux morts thus come to document a sort of history that 
chronicles the nganga’s owner’s agency and mystical pursuits in, for example, heal-
ing the sick, influencing the outcome of court cases, procuring exit visas to the 
United States, or warding off sorcerous attacks. But the history thus materialized 
systematically blurs the bright lines of Western common-sense ontological divi-
sions, such as those between persons and things, life and death, past and present. 
While a new nganga is fed with its owner’s blood, initiation into the cult of a nganga 
involves rubbing some of the nganga’s contents into small wounds cut into the skin 
of the future palero, rendering the nganga and its owner the coconstitutive parts 
of a supra-individual relation. Such relations ramify outward in space and time by 
assimilating actors and entities on both sides of the divide between the living and 
the dead: just as new initiates literally become consubstantial with the ngangas they 
acquire, so will a palero “seed” a nganga object fashioned for a neophyte with parts 
of the contents of his own nganga (which, in turn, had once been charged with ele-
ments derived from a preexisting nganga), thus constituting a pattern that cascades 
across time and (social) space in a historicity that appears to defy any and all West-
ern modes of temporal, physical, and even metaphysical common sense. 
This common sense arises from the widely shared historicist supposition con-
solidated in the early modern period (Fasolt 2004; Koselleck 1988, 2004) that the 
past is past, and separated from the present, which is, in turn, separate from the 
future. In line with the view of classical physics, students of history are taught to 
understand the past in its own terms, and not pollute it by anachronistic assump-
tions about the operation of ideas or technologies that only arose later. The nganga, 
in contrast, is an exercise in temporal pollution. Like the Naxos villagers who found 
their past riding on the coattails of their future, or the Guhu-Samane, whose past 
had to be retrospectively changed in order to prefigure their present conversion 
to Christianity, time may not be realized as linear and progressive. Ethnographic 
sensitivity to the intricate linkages between past, present, and future guides the an-
thropological study of histories as they take shape in specific social settings. 
This holds just as true for historicism, where historians have constantly fended 
off the specter of presentism in order to conduct the business of history. Mod-
ern historiography purifies itself (Latour 1993) of temporal pollution to create the 
past as an object of the present. There are historical reasons for this. According 
to Fasolt (2004), modern history in the form we know it arose in the seventeenth 
century as people began to assert the possibility of a different future where they 
would not be held so firmly in place by the church or the monarch. Not unlike the 
Guhu-Samane, or the Naxiots, in the process of creating a new present and future, 
they changed their understanding of the past. The past was now conceived to be 
separate and different from the present. A notion of human individuality, free will, 
choice, and change came gradually to inform historical study as well as personal 
assumptions about life. If the future would be novel and undecided, then the past 
must have taken shape under the same conditions. This spelled the end of pattern 
and teleology in history, and the beginning of historicism, as we know it. Fasolt 
(2005) went so far as to cast the practice of history in the West as a ritual reaffirma-
tion of human liberty, constantly repeated to remind us of our innermost values of 
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individual autonomy. But as Latour would have predicted, and as the essays in this 
collection show, like all programs of modernistic purification, this one, too, turns 
out hybrid after hybrid. 
Scales and modes 
Perhaps, each nganga object—just like a dead Sakalava royal taking possession of 
its medium, the Virgin appearing in Naxiot dreams, a series of commemorative 
postage stamps, or the Gregorian calendar—is best seen as constituting a chro-
notopic constellation of its own: encompassing a register of potential eventuation 
with its own coordinates of space, time, and value. A key concept for the anthro-
pology of history that we envision, Bakhtin’s (1981) notion of the “chronotope” 
needs addressing here, especially since, as Wirtz rightly notes, it is “increasingly 
cited, sometimes applied, but only rarely given sustained theoretical attention” (this 
collection, p. 343). In contrast to the naïvely Newtonian nature of Western tem-
poral common sense, Bakhtin’s concept analogically recurs to a post-Einsteinian 
relativity from which a plurality of senses of space and time become not only think-
able, but also potentially psychologically and socially inhabitable. Fusing Bakhtin’s 
own concept of heterochronicity with a non-Euclidian notion of space, one might 
call this “heterochronotopy,”14 in order to capture the dialogic relationship between 
chronotopes in a social field—a concept akin to heteroglossia, but emphasizing 
the evocation of temporal envelopes rather than just persons and authorities per 
se. While structuring the time-space coordinates of social ontologies in a way that 
makes eventuation thinkable in the first place, such chronotopes, according to 
Bakhtin’s crucial insight, are themselves “historical,” that is, subject to change and 
modification over time. Here we have, it seems, a way of operationalizing Sahlins’ 
notion that “an event is a relation between a happening and a structure” (1985: xiv, 
emphasis in original), so that a potential multiplicity of locally salient chronotopic 
registers can determine what, if anything, can come to constitute an “event,” and 
what incidents get banished to the realm of mere duration: the “empty stretches” 
(Ardener 1989) that largely make up the unnoticed and unnoticeable “incremen-
tal,” “eventless,” even “evolutionary” (Ingold 1986) or “structural” (in Braudel’s 
[1980] sense) processes by which social systems—including their chronotopic re-
gimes—get both reproduced and transformed over time.15
14. Indeed, Wirtz proposed this coinage in earlier drafts of her contribution to the 
collection.
15. With reference to Melanesian ethnography, Strathern (1988) offers an entirely different 
conception of events (such as first contact), which she likens to images. These images 
already contain meaningful relations with the viewer and the event is a performance 
where these relations become evident and receive interpretation. How is one implicated 
in the event? What has one done to provoke it? And thus, how does the event already 
pertain to one? In this Melanesian event concept, the meaning of the event is internal to 
it, while in Western models it is external to the event and derived by situating it against 
structure and time.
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At the same time, the chronotope offers a concept of unstable time, where chutes 
into the past can suddenly open and afford time transportation, which is why, in 
usage, it is not always clear if chronotope refers to a present “here” or a temporally 
removed “there.” When Wirtz speaks with some Cuban oldtimers about religion 
in the past—in what, for her, was a chronotope of “the interview” grounded in 
basic historicist assumptions—they begin singing, thereby opening for themselves 
a chronotope of spiritual immanence. And spirits of the dead duly appear. Mean-
while, the reggaeton music blaring on the street constantly threatens to shatter 
the frame and haul everyone back into the chronotope of the Cuban present. This 
shows the complexity of triggers for activating different chronotopes, which can 
vary from subtle linguistic cues to ambient soundscapes and visual phenomena 
encountered by chance. 
Everything in the present has a past, and therefore the potential to be viewed 
as historical, yet we operate much of the time without noticing the historical as-
pect of, say, the window we look through or the paper we write on—these objects 
and activities are transacted instrumentally in the present, conceptually uncon-
stituted as such (Lucas 2004), and thus readily “at hand” (in Heidegger’s sense) as 
a material scaffolding for our present pursuits. To activate historical thought, to 
see our worlds as “pastful,” we must perform the operation of viewing the “pres-
ent under the aspect of the past” (sub specie praeteritorum), as the philosopher of 
history Oakeshott phrased it (1933: 118). Chronotopes are different from intel-
lectual switches where we agree to consider the past. They are modal switches that 
activate—often unintentionally and spontaneously—particular pasts in joint or 
individual attention.
In chronotopic switching, affectivity takes precedence over reference: in Jakob-
son’s (1960) terms, the expressive function in communication has salience over the 
referential; mood, the feel of the past, floats above tense, which classifies pastness 
and relative pastness. When Swann tastes the chronotopic madeleine in Proust’s 
novel, he is conducted by his sense of taste to the emotive recovery of Sunday 
mornings at his aunt’s house. It is not one particular Sunday morning on a given 
date, but the general affective overtone of Sunday mornings during that time of 
his life. Chronotopes often carry an iterative aspectual dimension, the imperfec-
tive, which captures action from the inside. They deliver people into generalized 
past worlds, epochs, eras, or envelopes of time, not necessarily to fixed points and 
singular moments. 
The Alevi ritual of cem provides a further example. Participants light twelve can-
dles for the twelve martyrs (imams) of their faith, douse them, and begin to weep 
as they immerse themselves in the thought of painful events, recent and distant, in 
an act of analogical compression where the present, near past, and remote past are 
fused. The cem includes music and a trance-inducing dance in which participants 
commune with their history, embodying it and bringing it to life. The pictures of 
Atatürk (the twentieth-century political leader), Haji Bektash (the thirteenth-cen-
tury mystic), and Ali (the seventh-century son-in-law of Muhammad) prominently 
hanging on the wall act as visual guides to the past, prompting people to sink into 
thought of their history as a concatenation of suffering (Mandel 2008: 255, 280). 
In a different, but not unrelated, way, among the Wari’ of the Brazilian Amazon 
(Conklin 2001), the smell of decomposing flesh, the sight or smell of burning trees 
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or huts, and the size of trees in the forest are all historicizing triggers. They are 
indices of persons who have died. The Wari’, however, work the chronotope from 
the opposite direction (cf. Taylor 1993). They want to forget people who have died 
because it is too painful to remember them; thus there are no memorials or grave-
stones, only the gaps in nature and society, opened up particularly wide because the 
Wari’ obliterate houses and trees or plants associated with the deceased (Conklin 
2001: 224ff.; n.d.). These gaps are antimonuments, visible less as man-made “lieux 
de mémoire” than as the work of biotic processes contingent upon human interfer-
ence in the realm of the nonhuman (such as in the new vegetation emerging from 
burnt forest spaces). But they are nonetheless reflections of a past separated from 
the present. Instead of submitting to the affectivity of history—the passion of the 
past—the Wari’ seek to establish tense at the expense of mood in order to render 
the past definitively over and done. This attitude resembles Western historicism’s 
separation of past and present, with the difference that, among the Wari’, no one 
is invited to go back and research and recover this type of personal past in a form 
approaching historiography. They are content to know that their deceased have 
been transformed into spirits or animals occupying a timeless mythic dimension, 
and therefore are not located in the past at all (Conklin n.d.; cf. Taylor 1993: 675). 
Inverting Harvey’s (1989) diagnosis of the chronotope of technomodernity—the 
annihilation of space by time—the Wari’ annihilate time by reworking lived space 
or place.
Given the particularities of the Wari’ case, it may seem ironic that Western his-
toriography cultivates a similar dispassionate relation to the past. Overdependence 
on the affective connection to an epoch or zeitgeist runs against the grain of his-
toricism, which seeks to establish truths about the past on the basis of tangible evi-
dence and by providing temporal specificity in relation to the chronological code. 
Academic history also seeks to keep the past in the past, by objectifying it—just 
not in the form of altered landscapes sinking back into the gradual oblivion guar-
anteed by micro- and macrobiotic processes (Harrison 2004), but by entombing it 
in writing (de Certeau 1988). Each wave of revisionary interpretation that grips the 
discipline in roughly generational intervals thus might be analogized to secondary 
burials as they are known from the ethnographic literature. 
But as is made clear by the essays in this collection that explicitly deal with “the 
West” (Handler, Hamann), such distancing between the present and the past has 
an epistemic premise: professional historians espouse primarily a correspondence 
theory of history where, in order to be true, statements about the past must cap-
ture actual past arrangements. The alternative would be a coherence theory where 
statements can be true because they are consistent with expectations, beliefs, and 
sentiments held by the historian as an individual and a member of society. Not sur-
prisingly, we find both of these epistemologies coexisting in Western societies. The 
Chicago world’s fair of 1893 commemorated the four hundredth anniversary of Co-
lumbus’ discovery of America. This was such a large “event” that it exposed some 
indicative problems of scale for Western historical thinking. Which was the actual 
moment that one wished to remember? The Post Office issued a commemorative 
series of sixteen stamps parsing out the events within the event, breaking down 
the broad chronotopic epoch into specific points in time. These events were then 
ranked, with the most significant moments pictured on the lowest-denomination 
2016 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (1): 207–236
221 Introduction
stamps, so that the largest number of people would encounter them. Capitalist eco-
nomic considerations and democratic values thus drove historical production. 
The conflict between affective—value-rational, in Weber’s sense—and histori-
cist histories continues to surface in recent and ongoing public discussions. Con-
sider the following case: on September 28, 1987, a group of African Americans first 
celebrated what since has become a major tourist attraction, sponsored by the City 
of Annapolis. Originally known as Kunta Kinte Arrival Day, the Kunta Kinte Heri-
tage Festival nowadays draws thousands of visitors.16 It commemorates an event 
that—at least for academic historians—remains beyond verification and endorse-
ment: the arrival of novelist Alex Haley’s putative Gambian ancestor Kunta Kinte 
(a fictitious name, as Haley conceded) among ninety-eight slaves brought to An-
napolis aboard the ship Lord Ligonier on that day in 1767, as described in Haley’s 
1976 novel Roots: The saga of an American family, and portrayed in the 1977 TV 
miniseries Roots. Even at the time, Haley was widely criticized by historians who—
while not impugning his motives—rather conclusively proved that Kunta Kinte 
was a figment of the author’s imagination. And yet Kunta Kinte’s—ostensibly ficti-
tious—arrival in America has now been commemorated for close to a generation.
A curious case of text come to life, we might say. Fiction celebrated as historical 
fact. And yet, ought we not ask: From whose perspective? Make no mistake here. 
There is no doubt in the archival record that the British slaver Lord Ligonier went to 
anchor at Annapolis on September 28, 1767, and disgorged a mass of enslaved Afri-
cans: human commodities who survived the middle passage, were sold at auction, 
introduced into New World plantation slavery, and forcefully renamed as Toby, 
Phoebe, Jack, or George. Every one a Kunta Kinte of sorts, and some of them the 
distant, often unknown, ancestor of those who commemorate a fictitious—or not 
so fictitious—event at the Annapolis City Docks each September.
Correspondence to historical facts, no. Coherence with the moral vision of a 
vast number of Americans of African descent, yes. The story of Kunta Kinte is 
true at this scalar level, and as a proxy for the family history of a great number of 
people in the United States today. The history profession demands, however, that 
if specific names, dates, and places are adduced, then they must be verifiable in the 
record. A commemorative postage stamp has value for collectors, yet, as Handler 
notes in this collection, it takes on even more value if it is canceled with a postal 
date stamp at the exhibition it commemorates. That is the historicist perfecta: the 
iconically compelling commemorative stamp turned into an index of the proof of 
actual connection to the exhibition place and time; the knowledge of an African 
ancestor beyond documentary authentification, in contrast, remains in a historicist 
limbo, no matter how compelling its moral veracity may be to large numbers of 
contemporary Americans. 
Historicities in collision
Returning to our earlier distinction between historicism, on the one hand, and 
historical practices in Western societies, on the other, we have used the former to 
16. See http://www.kuntakinte.org. 
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indicate broadly a type of historical practice to which professional historians aspire, 
and which the educational systems of Western countries impart. This general sen-
sibility about history—what it is, and how to do it—is, as we have shown, largely 
consistent with natural science and practice in other spheres of society such as law 
and government. Yet it is also clear that the underlying principles of historicism are 
not fully espoused by everyone all the time. People operate with multiple tenets of 
historical thought in the West, as, indeed, they do in other societies. The ways of 
establishing relationships to the past in the West quite simply cannot be reduced 
to a standardized monothetic set of practices. To claim otherwise would be to suc-
cumb to the allure of a facile “Occidentalism.”17 We suggest that this plurality of 
historicizing practices be viewed more as a polythetic set (Needham 1975) where 
practitioners share certain common suppositions but not others, and also where 
they mix in tenets excluded by historicism, such as adoption of the wrong scale of 
analysis, overreliance on affect, or representation in unrecognized forms such as 
dancing.18 The anthropology of history creatively investigates this area of mismatch 
between asserted or assumed ideals and actual practices, showing in the process 
that historical practice in the West shares much more in common with historical 
practices outside the West than one might like to think.
What better antidote to the temptation to a self-congratulatory Occidentalism, 
then, than Hamann’s study (this collection) of the Catholic Church’s replacement 
of the Julian calendar by the Gregorian calendar in the sixteenth century in order 
to fix more precisely the date of Christ’s resurrection (i.e., Easter). Although this 
change eventually did spread its empty, homogeneous units of time measurement 
across the globe, gaining belated scientific ratification in the form of atomic clocks 
initially calibrated to its specifications, it originally arose as an eschatological in-
strument. Furthermore, the calendar that we now take to epitomize progressive, 
secular time was actually designed as an instrument to “reduce” time, that is, make 
it go backward to the perfection of Eden, reversing the degenerated Julian system 
of reckoning. The endorsement of the Catholic Church aroused opposition in Prot-
estant countries such as England, where the Gregorian calendar was not accepted 
for many years. The idea of a secular universal time arising in the early modern 
period emerges as an Occidentalist misconstrual of a divisive, religious innovation. 
The Spanish Catholic interest in redemption and eschatology actually had much 
more in common with the viewpoints of local peoples in Mexico or Afghanistan 
17. As Carrier (1992) termed the still all too common tendency among anthropologists to 
contrast their richly nuanced ethnographies of non-Western worlds with deadly mono-
lithic and essentialist accounts of “the West.”
18. The latter moment was vividly exemplified at an academic conference on “The Slave 
Trade in History and Memory” held at the University of Chicago in 1997. As one of 
the authors of this introduction vividly recalls, during a discussion period, an Afri-
can American member of the audience asked to perform the “Song of the Sons and 
Daughters of the Pyramids” as a comment on the academic proceedings. Her request 
was granted, but what followed her intervention was awkward silence on the part of 
the majority of scholars assembled. See Berlin (2004) for a reflection on a conference 
gone comparatively badly awry owing to the expression of divergent visions of the past, 
unassimilable within the academic historicist frame.
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(Hamann, this collection) than it did with secular modernity (cf. Subramanyam 
1997). The congruence of present-day common-sense history (at various social 
levels) vis-à-vis paradigms of past relationships in world societies is not likely so 
extreme, but Hamann’s study of the calendar furnishes a provocative analogy in 
regard to the historical specificity of historicism’s chronological code.
Anthropologists and historians have used the handy terms “historicity” (Sah-
lins 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Trouillot 1995; Hirsch and Stewart 2004; 
Stewart in press) or “regimes of historicity” (Hartog 2015) to capture the cultural 
paradigms modulating historical experience and practice, with the often unstat-
ed premise that what, at least since Marx, has come to be known in the West as 
“historical consciousness” might be subsumable under such terms as well.19 In this 
collection, several such historicities—or forms of human awareness of being and 
becoming in time—are on display, notably the image of the sunrise on the Tlax-
calan lienzo (Hamann), which signifies the end of an epoch and the beginning of 
a new one; or the figuralism of Bible interpretation with its anticipatory post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc logic (Handman). Perhaps the most striking is Lambek’s deeply 
impressive explication of the “sublunary” historicity of the Sakalava royal lineage, 
which waxes and wanes, neither strictly linear nor reversible. Yet Lambek is careful 
to explain that this historicity sits alongside other historicities, such as the com-
moner historicity of death and replacement. It is also subject to internal tensions 
and political oppositions within its own terms of spirit possession. Finally, it sits 
inside other historicities, notably that of modern global historicism, with which it 
contends, in a continual dynamic relationship as an “immodern” counterpart.
The analysis of Sakalava historicity resonates with our preceding observation 
about the nonunitary nature of Western historicism, itself but one example of a 
historicity, as we would like the term to be understood here. Although convenient, 
one must be vigilant not to allow the term “historicity” to lull one into thinking 
that the principles of a historicity—its “regime,” in Hartog’s (2015) sense—are all 
shared and equally distributed among members of a society. Societies borrow from 
each other and change internally, which creates dynamic situations such as the 
different understandings of Kunta Kinte, or the uncertainty of the Guhu-Samane 
man who, unlike many of his consociates, could not find his genealogy in the Bible 
(Handman, this collection). At such moments, as Handman goes on to say, it is 
often a charismatic figure who effects change through resort to chronotopic speech 
genres—in this case, one of revelation—that alter convictions in an Austinian per-
locutionary act. 
The architecture, imagery, rituals, and cultural logics of different historici-
ties come into view especially at moments of collision between utterly heteroge-
neous historicities—or chronotopic regimes. To give yet another example, Sahlins 
19. The German notion of “Geschichtlichkeit,” which was crucial to Hegel’s notion of his-
torical consciousness as a component of civic ethical life, “Sittlichkeit,” became key to 
Marx’s vision of historical emancipation. But in our present usage, it designates but one 
among many other “historicities”—a concept that we would urge ought to be taken to 
embrace a far wider range of “past relationships” than Marxist notions of “historical 
consciousness,” or the more common anthropological formulations recurring to it (if, 
shall we say, only “in the last instance”). 
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(1985: 54ff.) tells the story of how the Maori repeatedly tore down the flagpole erect-
ed by the British during the Maori revolt in the 1840s. The British, who were trying 
to forge an alliance with the Maori chiefs that would effectively give them sover-
eignty over New Zealand, could not understand why the Maori did not destroy the 
Union Jack flying on the flagpole—the very symbol, to their minds, of “sovereignty.” 
Sahlins explains that for the Maori, the future is behind one: everything that hap-
pens in the present is an analogical reoccurrence of an earlier cosmological event. In 
Maori cosmology, in the beginning, the sky was collapsed onto the earth and a hero 
prized the two apart and propped the sky up above the earth using four poles. This 
was the originary event by which the ancestors claimed possession of the land. The 
British flagpole was seen as replicating this cosmic event and claiming ownership of 
the land, hence it had to be knocked down over and over again. A British historicity 
of progressive, future-oriented colonial expansion crossed swords with a historicity 
emphasizing the eternal return of the past. They diverged fundamentally over the 
identification and significance of “the event” at the heart of the flagpole affair. 
Something similar happened on the island of Naxos, where, after independence 
in 1832, the new Bavarian-led government of the independent Greek state, seeking 
to cultivate a less mystical version of Greek Orthodoxy, confiscated the villagers’ 
newly discovered icons. They accused several charismatic dreamers of charlatanry 
and took them to court. The villagers’ Christian-infused archaeological practice 
was delegitimated by new laws against the excavation of artifacts without a permit. 
Objects in the ground were reconfigured as part of a frozen past perfect, highly 
valued as patrimony, and placed under protection in line with historicist ideas. For 
the villagers, the icons were part of a past imperfect, a continuous liturgical pres-
ent in an Orthodox Christian temporality where figures from the past such as the 
saints portrayed on icons can be in the home, touched, kissed, and treated virtually 
as family members. 
What (to use Lévi-Strauss’ terminology) was “heating up” matters in these cas-
es is what Sahlins might call the vicissitudes of a “structure of the conjuncture” 
between different ways of organizing and recognizing “events” and making them 
stand out from the endless stream of nonevents that form their backdrop in the so-
cial imaginaries in question. But as Wirtz (this collection) shows, what we may need 
to consider is that such moments do not only operate on a macroscale, but equally 
characterize social interaction on the most microsociological levels, even among 
members of one and the same social formation. Attention to real-time everyday 
social language use and performativity thus can reveal switches of chronotopic reg-
isters that, in themselves, demonstrate the potential heterochronotopy of any and 
all regimes of historicity. We may not think of it this way, but our lifeworlds are 
inherently “plural”—full of “multiple realities” (Schuetz 1945), including temporal 
ones, that can be activated, and given a “reality accent,” at any moment, regardless 
of whatever may prompt such chronotopic switches: a certain linguistic cue, a tune 
(from the “soundtrack of our lives”), or a whiff of something, we can often not even 
tell what it is, that triggers olfactorily encoded forms of experiences of the past. The 
key issue, as Wirtz reminds us, is that these transportations across chronotopes are 
social in nature: not only recognizable in the instant that they occur, but also iter-
able across various instances on the basis of a socially shared “semiotic ideology” 
(Keane 2003) allowing for what we might call past recognition. 
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Conclusion 
As is well known, years ago anthropology took what is now known as the “historic 
turn” (McDonald 1996). It went from a predominantly synchronic approach to so-
cieties frozen in an “ethnographic present” (Fabian 1983) to recognizing the need 
for historical perspective. Eric Wolf ’s Europe and the people without history (1982), 
published over thirty years ago now, can be pointed to as a landmark. This initia-
tive gave rise to colonial and postcolonial historical studies where anthropologists 
placed peripheral societies within our framework of history. We gave them history 
according to our historical reasoning, and often as tied up with our own story of 
contact with them. This led to some important and, at times, spectacular revalu-
ations of non-Western pasts—but always on terms that were ours. Just how these 
people themselves conceived and represented the past was less often studied.
Not only that, however: as many critics have noted, historicism drives out 
of circulation what Nandy (1995) calls its non-Western “doubles,” as if by some 
Gresham’s law of epistemological economy. Ironically, when anthropology took its 
“historic turn,” it largely took Western historicism off the shelf and used it as the 
tacit gold standard in its well-intentioned endeavors to reconstruct, verify, and le-
gitimate other modes of relating to the past.20 However impressive the results were 
in many instances, the inescapable conundrum was (and remains) that the result-
ing historicization of “other pasts” subjected them to a regime of historicity that, 
as we have argued, is not even consistently pervasive in the West itself. The task at 
hand for an anthropology of history thus involves not solely appreciating “other 
pasts” delegitimated by, subordinated to, or subsumed under Western academic 
historiography. We also need a reverse anthropology where Western historicism 
itself, as it arose and triumphed in the course of the nineteenth century over earlier 
or rival forms and principles of generating knowledge about the past, comes into 
focus as a historically and culturally specific, if nowadays near globally diffused, 
phenomenon. 
As Mannheim diagnosed in 1924: “Historicism is a Weltanschauung that de-
termines our forms of thought” (1952: 85). By the time of his writing, historicism 
as “the Weltanschauung of modernity” had become hard to think outside of, and 
this—to this day—makes recognizing and understanding other cultural approach-
es to the past a major challenge. Hence we must recognize the framing power of our 
intuitive suppositions—our chronotopic ethnocentrism—and suspend judgment 
when it comes to other modes of forging past relationships. This means placing 
our own historical imagination and praxis in a broader context of human cultural 
possibilities and thereby putting historicism at productive risk. 
20. A case in point is that of “ethnohistory” as it came to prominence in the United States 
in the aftermath of the Indian Claims Act of 1946. Called in as expert witnesses in the 
readjudication of Native American treaties, well-meaning and often politically engaged 
anthropologists then mined Native American oral traditions for visions of the past that 
could be commensurated with the forensics of history inherent in the American legal 
system (on which see, e.g., Levi’s [1948] classic Introduction to legal reasoning), and 
so unwittingly “gave” Native Americans a version of their past that bore that ratifying 
stamp of academic historicism.
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The anthropology of history thus ventures on the assertion that we have not 
always been looking for history in the right places. This, however, raises a crucial 
question: How does one define “history” so as to do the anthropology of it, without 
reimporting Western historicism as the framework through which all other past 
relationships are viewed? Our suggestion is that we begin with a simple, heuristic 
definition of “history” not only as “practices of knowledge production” aiming at 
forging “relations to the past,” but also as “intimations of the past,” since the past 
may be perceived nonobjectively, or sensed affectively (even if later given repre-
sentation, the experiential moment of the historical is relevant). Representation of 
such past relationships, and the mode in which they are cast—scriptural, mnemon-
ic, constituted by evanescent cues, or features of the landscape traversed by human 
groups who relate to them in such a way—all these are not matters to be decided 
a priori on conceptual grounds, but need to be opened to ethnographic inquiry. 
To quote Sahlins once more: not only “no history without culture,” but also “other 
cultures, other historicities” (1985: x).21
Western historicism generally expresses itself in writing, hence the term “his-
toriography,” which is often conflated with history itself. The anthropology of his-
tory requires new vocabulary, since “historiography” is manifestly inapplicable to 
dreaming, dancing, spirit possession, walking through newly reforested areas, or 
even collecting postage stamps. How shall we talk about these ways of relating to 
the past, and human consciousness of temporality and eventuation more generally? 
Terms such as historicization, “historical poiesis” (Lambek 2002), and neologisms 
such as “historification” come into usage to capture productions/representations of 
the past that do not necessarily take shape through conscious, rational reflection, or 
receive expression in writing. All of these terms refer to “the making of history”; not 
in the manner conceived by Marx, which involved decisive action on the ground, 
but rather as the a posteriori making of representations of what went on in the past, 
and how such past goings-on might relate to the world as people variously know it.
The introduction of new vocabulary, the discovery of previously unrecognized 
forms of historical practice in and outside the West, and the probing of the as-
sumptions underlying common sense about history—can these effect any change 
in “history”? To ask such a question is to ask if anthropological knowledge can 
affect society. The historicism within which we dwell and write these pages con-
strains us from predicting the future. On the one hand, the studies collected here 
might encourage those operating outside the paradigm of historicism to remain 
confident in their local practices because historicism is not consistently practiced, 
or even entirely different from what they do. But it might also bring new ideas into 
historicism and alter its sense of itself as the only correct form of history. It might 
further precipitate the recognition of its parochialism—something Chakrabarty 
(2000) and other postcolonial historians have been persuasively arguing for. 
In our view, historicism will change, when it does—and perhaps it is already 
changing—for the very reasons recognized in its own principles, namely that the 
21. Even if the moment of mal d’archive that Derrida (1995) identified late in his life 
were a part of the human condition (and this is an empirical question, too), the 
sources of “archontic” power envisioned and desired in each instance are—shall we 
say—underdetermined. 
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future is bound to differ from the past. As intellectual historians might be the first 
to point out: thought is historical. Concepts—and “history” is one such concept—
are bound into genealogical relations of discursive productivity (Daston 2000; 
Hacking 2002). To be sure, the same can be said of the discursive grounds from 
which we—two anthropologists—launch our call “for an anthropology of history.” 
Yet the expectation for the anthropology of history, as we envision it, is not to in-
stigate or engineer change in historical practice, but rather to study it as it happens. 
It is a call for empirical attention by anthropologists, historians, and practitioners 
of other disciplines. As we have contended above, “regimes of historicity” and their 
prevalent chronotopes are themselves subject to historical transformation. This is 
no contradiction in terms: past relationships have a history. As Boas might have 
said, our task is to chronicle the social history of the unfolding and transformation 
of humanity’s “secondary explanations”: the stories we collectively make up about 
who we are, how we came to be, and why this should matter (Bunzl 2004). 
An illustration of this issue can be seen in NAGPRA (the North American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act), which provides Native American groups 
the right to reclaim and bury the remains of their ancestors when graves are found 
on federal or tribal land. This framework enables Native Americans to rehistori-
cize commercial American real estate, as happened in Port Angeles, Washington 
(Boyd 2009). Building work on a new dry dock was suspended when construction 
workers unearthed the remains of a 2700-year-old Coast Salish community con-
taining some three hundred graves. During the process of excavation, several of 
the Native American archaeological workers were visited by their ancestors (what 
many Americans would call “ghosts”). Ultimately the construction of the industrial 
harbor was abandoned and the land redeveloped to hold an archaeological site and 
museum as well as the reinterred graves. Here we have a state-legislated rewriting of 
the terms on which previously nonsanctioned past relationships may attain not just 
historical salience, but politically binding force. The legal system of the dominant 
culture ruled against its own rationalist historicity. For the disgruntled townspeo-
ple, ghosts and ancestors stood in the way of progress. The Port Angeles case shows 
that other historicities may not be disregarded the way they used to be (imagine the 
Maori erecting poles and reclaiming parts of New Zealand under the law!).
But such reassertion of “other” historicities is only one part of a larger spectrum 
of transformations of historical praxis and experience underway in Western societ-
ies. The emergence of new technologies such as digital platforms for simulating and 
interacting with the past, and social trends such as historical reenactment and the 
cresting popularity of historical fiction, historical film, TV documentaries, and info-
tainment have fed the emergence of alternative historicities in the West, and eroded 
some of the bedrock from under standard historicism. Perhaps we are witnessing the 
creation of a hybrid historicism. Video games such as JFK Reloaded or Brothers in 
Arms: Road to Hill 30 immerse players in pasts where they make choices in real time. 
The Robben Island video game currently under development by the Serious Games 
Institute in Coventry enables students to visit the island virtually and interactively to 
approximate the experience that Mandela and other prisoners may have had.22 The 
written mediation of history, and the framing of the past as an object located in a 
22. http://www.seriousgamesinstitute.co.uk/applied-research/Mandela27.aspx.
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different time frame from that of the historian, are replaced by direct, visual, sensory 
engagement with the past; an active, affective mode of historicization. As Rigney 
(2010: 116) has pointed out, the Internet search engine and web-generated pathways 
are replacing the logic of narrative connection in popular historical thought. 
 Equally indicative are the disputes over the school history curriculum in the 
United Kingdom, in particular those over “child-centered learning,” which broke out 
in 2013. Introduced in the 1970s, “child-centered learning” became the bête noire of 
conservative critics, who argue that it is one of the reasons why people were not com-
pleting school with an adequate history education. Child-centered learning involves, 
among other things, experiential exercises such as imagining oneself as a soldier 
in the trenches of World War I, or standing packed tightly together to experience 
what conditions were like on a slave ship making the Atlantic crossing. Conservative 
reformers sought to curtail this form of pedagogy in favor of a better understand-
ing of chronology, key political figures, and major events.23 History teaching, as the 
opponents of such reform argue, becomes impossibly reduced to a boot camp for an 
“ultra-orthodox” historicism that most academic historians would reject. 
From the perspective of the anthropology of history, this is a disagreement be-
tween a restrictive version of historicism and other versions of historicism. It is a 
civil war within historicism. But it should also be noted that those on the side of 
child-centered learning stand on a continuum with practices of experiential and af-
fective historical practice outside the boundaries of historicism, and, indeed, some-
times at odds with historiography. Historical reenactors in the United States told 
researchers (Handler and Saxton 1988) that history books are not authenticating 
reference points for them; it is rather their personal experience of the past during 
reenactments that makes history meaningful. Proof by reference to external evi-
dence is, for them, secondary to personal experiential witnessing. 
Ranke’s dictum that we should understand the past “as it really was” has gener-
ally been taken as an incitement to the fullest scholarly documentation possible. 
But it has also been understood within the hermeneutic tradition (surveyed by 
Gadamer [1960] 1994: 173–264) as trying one’s best to establish the internal life-
world of the past—basically trying to understand the past from the point of view of 
those who lived in the past. To this day, this tension has not been resolved, let alone 
properly theorized, within the discipline of history (but see Robinson 2010 for a 
rare attempt to do so). One suspects that many historians began with an affective 
fascination for past events, personages, and places, and many probably do still have 
their own quasi-shamanic imaginary methods for envisioning the past to go along 
with their dispassionate scholarship.24 
23. At the height of these history battles, the historian Niall Ferguson (2013) laid blame for 
the decline of history learning at the feet of “child-centered” learning, which supplant-
ed “source analysis.” The proponents of experiential and world history—as opposed to 
a history curriculum focused heavily on Britain—seem to have won this round. The 
minister of education who proposed the reforms was removed from his position in 
mid-2014, and the proposed reforms were softened.
24. Collingwood’s (1946) “historical imagination” covers the logical inferences histori-
ans need to make beyond what is given in the evidence. This can shade into more 
intuitive practices, such as the techniques of the famous Greek archaeologist Manolis 
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The advent of popular visual and digital technologies, then, did not create expe-
riential modes of accessing the past. Instead, these new technologies have remedi-
ated this type of past relationship and given it new vitality, just as cell phones have 
redelivered a social connectedness more reminiscent of Melanesian dividuality 
than Western individuality. Technologies do not solely increase modernity. They 
have reenergized long-standing historicities and perhaps made “us” more like ev-
eryone else. Ironically, then, it may be through the mediation of IT that the West re-
veals itself to be not as modern as it purports to be; in fact, it looks to be retreating 
from some former expectations of modernity that may now be transforming into 
“futures past” (Koselleck 2004). The time for dancing, singing, and acting histories 
interactively may arrive sooner than we imagine. 
In conclusion, the recognition of this plurality of historicities and their fusions 
here in the West might give us a better platform from which to see our common-
ality with the repertoires of historicity found in other societies around the world. 
Rather than engineering the sudden importation of their principles into ours, we 
can recognize that much of what they do we also already do. To say so, as anthro-
pologists, is by no means to diminish the work of our colleagues in history depart-
ments, many of whom are engaging similar questions from their own disciplinary 
vantage points. It is to say that the anthropology of history—like any form of an-
thropology—attends to all these practices and orientations and attempts to capture 
their inner worlds of thought and experience.
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Introduction: Pour une anthropologie de l’histoire
Résumé : Bien que Sahlins l’a proposé il y a maintenant plus de trente ans, et en 
dépit de quelques contributions remarquables entretemps, aucun véritable mou-
vement vers une anthropologie de l’histoire n’a réellement émergé. Cette introduc-
tion, et les études de cas qui la suivent, révèlent les défis d’une telle entreprise en se 
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référant à des études ethnographiques conduites à Cuba, Madagascar, en Papoua-
sie-Nouvelle-Guinée, aux Etats-Unis, et dans l’espace Euro-Américain du début de 
l’époque moderne. L’anthropologie de l’histoire s’intéresse essentiellement à l’idée 
même d’histoire—ses présupposés, ses principes, les pratiques qui informent l’ac-
quisition de savoir sur le passé, et les formes qu’elle prend dans l’espace social. Trou-
ver les termes permettant de comprendre des formes alternatives de fabrication 
de l’histoire requiert une vision ethnographique et historique de la manière dont 
le concept occidental d’histoire (historicisme) fut développé, et de la façon dont 
cet historicisme réside en fait dans un ensemble de pratiques diverses au sein de 
communautés occidentales. On voit que l’anthropologie de l’histoire est appelée à 
être une vaste entreprise interdisciplinaire, incluant entre autres des archéologues 
et des historiens, afin de comprendre les possibilités de l’histoire comme pratique 
et comme méthode d’analyse
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